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Articles 
THE ARBITRATION SEESAW:  FEDERAL ACT 
PREEMPTS GENERAL LAW THEREBY 
RESTRICTING JUDICIAL REVIEW 
Tanya M. Marcum* and Elizabeth A. Campbell** 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Within the past three decades, the U.S. Supreme Court has teetered 
from its position that “the purpose of Congress in 1925 [for enacting the 
Federal Arbitration Act] was to make arbitration agreements as 
enforceable as other contracts, but not more so,”1 and, through judicial 
interpretation, it has tottered to a position whereby “the Court has 
abandoned all pretense of ascertaining congressional intent with respect 
to the Federal Arbitration Act, building instead, case by case, an edifice 
of its own creation.”2  Consequently, arbitration contracts, once subject to 
review under the common law doctrines of unconscionability and public 
policy as applied to all contracts,3 now appear exempt from such review 
and are enforceable absent such legal concerns.4  This results in the 
proposition that all contracts are equal, but some contracts are more 
                                                 
* Associate Professor, Foster College of Business Administration, Entrepreneurship, 
Technology and Law Department, Bradley University. 
** Professor, College of Business Administration, Department of Finance & Law, Central 
Michigan University. 
1 Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 404 n.12 (1967).  The 
Court went on to say that “[t]o immunize an arbitration agreement from judicial challenge 
on the ground of fraud in the inducement would be to elevate it over other forms of 
contract—a situation inconsistent with the ‘saving clause.’”  Id. 
2 Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 283 (1995) (O’Connor, J., 
concurring) (citation omitted). 
3 The Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2006).  Section 2 allows the courts to 
determine the enforceability of arbitration agreements “upon such grounds as exist at law 
or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”  Id. § 2. 
4 See Thomas J. Stipanowich, The Third Arbitration Trilogy: Stolt-Nielsen, Rent-A-Center, 
Concepcion and the Future of American Arbitration, 22 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 323, 327 (2012) 
(“[P]ro-arbitration federal policy circumscribes judicial authority to police arbitration 
agreements under state law.”); Thomas Stipanowich, The Third Arbitration Trilogy:  
Revelation, Reaction and Reflection on the Direction of American Arbitration, SCOTUSBLOG 
(Sept. 21, 2011, 8:36 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2011/09/the-third-arbitration-
trilogy-revelation-reaction-and-reflection-on-the-direction-of-american-arbitration/ 
[hereinafter Revelation, Reaction and Reflection] (“[P]ro-arbitration federal policy trumps 
state law affecting arbitration agreements . . . .”). 
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equal than others.5  The seesaw in jurisprudence is both applauded and 
criticized for the economic and social consequences it either affords or 
denies, depending on varying viewpoints. 
The shift in positions occurred incrementally and seemingly 
culminated in the recent decision AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 
where the Court held that nothing in the Federal Arbitration Act of 1925 
(“FAA”) “suggests an intent to preserve state-law rules that stand as an 
obstacle to the accomplishment of the FAA’s objectives.”6  This decision 
suggests that the FAA preempts general law doctrines, which prohibit 
traditional common law defenses previously relied upon to invalidate 
arbitration clauses.  The end result of the AT&T Mobility holding is that 
pre-dispute arbitration agreements—often referred to as adhesion 
contracts7—will be enforced without the safeguards of general law 
defenses against enforcement, no matter the language in the contract or 
disparity in bargaining positions.  Scholars agree that the implications of 
AT&T Mobility are far-reaching, as it will be applicable to a myriad of 
consumer and employment contracts.8  Furthermore, the High Court 
                                                 
5 Cf. GEORGE ORWELL, ANIMAL FARM 118 (1945) (“All animals are equal but some 
animals are more equal than others.”). 
6 See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1748 (2011) (holding that state 
law may not be used to invalidate a pre-dispute arbitration agreement that prohibited class 
action lawsuits).  
7 Matthew Parrott, Note, Is Compulsory Court-Annexed Medical Malpractice Arbitration 
Constitutional?  How the Debate Reflects a Trend Towards Compulsion in Alternative Dispute 
Resolution, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2685, 2697 (2007). 
Adhesion contracts are not defined by their subject matter, but rather 
by the relationship of power between the contracting parties.  
Adhesion contracts allow the powerful party—i.e., the drafting party—
“‘to legislate in a substantially authoritarian manner.’  This notion of 
legislating is not in any sense figurative.  It dramatizes the point that 
the drafter has the power to create new and different ‘law’ to govern 
the relations and disputes between itself and the adherer.” 
Id. (footnotes omitted).  “An adhesion contract is ‘a privately created document drafted by 
the dominant party to a legal relationship and imposed on the adherent without 
opportunity for negotiation or change.’”  Id. at n.97 (quoting Stephan Landsman, ADR and 
the Cost of Compulsion, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1593, 1596 (2005)). 
8 See Revelation, Reaction and Reflection, supra note 4 (discussing the far-reaching effects 
of the Court’s decision on consumers and employers); see also Press Release, Gibson Vance, 
AAJ Response to AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion SCOTUS Decision, (Apr. 27, 2011), available at 
http://www.justice.org/cps/rde/justice/hs.xsl/15220.htm (stating the negative effects the 
decision will have on consumers).  According to Vance, the AT&T Mobility Concepcion 
decision will permit massive corporate wrongdoing, because smaller claims will likely go 
unheard when the damages amount is too small to justify an individual claim and class 
action suits are not allowed.  Id.  See generally Jean R. Sternlight & Elizabeth J. Jensen, Using 
Arbitration to Eliminate Consumer Class Actions:  Efficient Business Practice or Unconscionable 
Abuse?, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter & Spring 2004, at 75 (2004) (examining the public 
policy reasons for and against eliminating consumer class action suits against unfair 
business practices).  Arbitration can be found in a variety of contexts including American 
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continues to re-enforce its previously established position that where an 
arbitration agreement exists, it must be implemented even where 
statutory violations are alleged.9 
This Article explores the current uncertainty in valid review of 
arbitration agreements and the unsettling trend by the U.S. Supreme 
Court to restrict the use of general law in such a review.  In doing so, this 
Article discusses the judicial justifications for supporting arbitration, the 
inconsistency in court cases’ holdings, and the historical validity of 
arbitration clauses.10  This Article also addresses the problem with 
judicial review in private arbitration, the consequences of recent court 
holdings, and the potential conflict between the language of the FAA 
and general law.11 
II.  RATIONALE FOR THE JUDICIAL SHIFT TO ARBITRATION 
Due to the use of private arbitration by disputants, the actual 
number of civil lawsuits has decreased in recent years.12  Instead of 
appointed or elected judges deciding the outcome of civil disputes, 
private arbitrators now resolve private conflicts and make private 
arbitration awards.  Various economic and social reasons have been put 
forth to explain this shift by the courts.  The following section discusses 
the economic, social, and constitutional reasons why the court shifted 
from a historically hostile attitude towards arbitration to one that 
embraces private arbitration. 
                                                                                                             
sports.  See, e.g., Michael L. Meyer, Note, If Nobody Picks up the Ball, Is It Really a Fumble, or Is 
It a Forfeit?  The NFL Players Association Request for Legislative Changes to the Labor-
Management Relations Act of 1947, 43 VAL. U. L. REV. 1375, 1396 n.105, 1409 n.176, 1410 n.177 
(2009) (discussing the role of arbitration as provided in the NFLPA White Paper with 
regards to retired player benefits); Joshua A. Reece, Note, Throwing the Red Flag on the 
Commissioner:  How Independent Arbitrators Can Fit into the NFL’S Off-Field Discipline 
Procedures Under the NFL Collective Bargaining Agreement, 45 VAL. U. L. REV. 359 (2010) 
(arguing that arbitration can be used in the sports context to preserve player’s rights when 
punished for improper off-the-field conduct). 
9 See CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 132 S. Ct 665, 673 (2012) (holding that alleged 
violations of the Credit Repair Organizations Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1679c(a), must be submitted 
to arbitration as agreed by the consumer in the credit card agreement). 
10 See infra Parts II, III, IV (discussing the benefits and consequences of arbitration, 
current irregularities in court holdings, and the historical approach to arbitration clauses). 
11 See infra Parts V, VI, VII (explaining the problems concerning judicial review of 
private arbitration, the effects of recent court cases, and potential issues in the language of 
the FAA). 
12 Stacey Keare, Reducing the Cost of Civil Litigation, PUB. LAW RESEARCH INST., 
http://gov.uchastings.edu/public-law/docs/plri/adr.pdf (last visited May 16, 2013). 
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A. Economic and Social Justifications for Arbitration 
Some have suggested that the privatization of civil disputes through 
arbitration likely saves money for the judiciary.  In contrast, any 
legislatively imposed anti-arbitration limitation would create an 
increased burden on the courts and a heightened cost to taxpayers who 
subsidize the judiciary.13  Budget information from various states reflects 
a court’s savings for every civil case that goes to arbitration rather than 
litigation.  Costs range from roughly $1,500 per case in Colorado to 
$3,000 per case in New Jersey,14 which demonstrates that the total cost of 
civil litigation is greatly reduced through the use of private arbitration.  
Therefore, at a time when judicial budgets have been cut, any reduction 
or prohibition on arbitration would result in a need for more judges, 
courtrooms, staffing, wages, and other related expenses.15  
                                                 
13 Mark Fellows, Limits on Arbitration Would Burden Courts and Taxpayers, METRO. CORP. 
COUNSEL, Dec. 2007, at 8, 8, available at www.metrocorpcounsel.com/pdf/2007/December/ 
08.pdf. 
14 Id.  But see Richard H.C. Clay & J. Tanner Watkins, Methods for Cost-Efficient Resolution 
in Arbitrations, FOR THE DEFENSE, Aug. 2010, at 36, 36–41 (2010) (explaining the costs that are 
associated with arbitration).  Arbitration costs typically include administrative costs, 
arbitrators’ fees, and litigation-related costs, like attorneys’ fees.  Id. at 37.  The arbitrator’s 
fee depends on the arbitrator’s hourly rate and the time it takes to arbitrate.  Id.  Costs for 
commercial arbitrators range from $600 to $5,000 per day. Id; see Christopher R. Drahozal, 
Arbitration Costs and Forum Accessibility:  Empirical Evidence, 41 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 813, 
820 tbl.2 (2008) (synthesizing data on arbitrator fees from Chicago, Colorado, Ohio, and 
Indiana). 
15 See generally Andrew Kloster, Why Congress and the Courts Must Respect Citizens’ Rights 
to Arbitration, BACKGROUNDER (Heritage Found., Washington D.C.), Mar. 27, 2013, 
http://s3.amazonaws.com/thf_media/2013/pdf/bg2784.pdf (arguing in favor of 
arbitration in order to administer quick and affordable solutions for the business 
community).  But see The Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009, H.R. 1020, 111th Cong. (2009) 
(arguing that certain limitations be placed on arbitration).  This bill was introduced again in 
Congress on May 12, 2011, by Minnesota Senator Al Franken.  See Arbitration Fairness Act 
of 2011, S. 987, 112th Cong. (2011).  If enacted, this Act would amend the FAA to prevent 
the use and enforceability of pre-dispute arbitration agreements in all consumer and 
employment contracts.  Id.  In proposing this Act, Congress stated the following: 
(1) The Federal Arbitration Act . . . was intended to apply to disputes 
between commercial entities of generally similar sophistication and 
bargaining power. 
 
(2) A series of decisions by the Supreme Court of the United States 
have changed the meaning of the Act so that it now extends to 
consumer disputes and employment disputes. 
 
(3) Most consumers and employees have little or no meaningful choice 
whether to submit their claims to arbitration.  Often, consumers and 
employees are not even aware that they have given up their rights. 
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Private arbitration is a way for the judiciary to be relieved of some of 
these expenses.  Attorney Mark Fellows has reiterated this point and 
offers the following support for his argument: 
 Armed with this information, we can begin to view 
the current crop of anti-arbitration legislation in a new 
light.  Arbitration opponents argue their case as if the 
public court system is a cost-free resource available at 
unlimited capacity.  In reality, any legislative restrictions 
on contractual arbitration will necessarily produce an 
increased burden on the court system that will require 
increased budget allocations to the judiciary.  Legislators 
and policymakers considering measures that would 
hinder private arbitration need to understand—and 
account for—their significant fiscal impact.16 
Additional studies have reached similar results, finding it to be 
“incontestable that private [alternative dispute resolution] has saved the 
court system money by preventing a number of disputes from entering 
the court system altogether.”17  The California Court’s Administrative 
Office has estimated a savings of over a half million dollars within a year 
earned from the reduced number of court days per case.18 
In addition, economically speaking, arbitration provides a savings to 
businesses that then passes to the consumer.  The reasoning is that 
 [t]he cost savings of arbitration accrue not only to 
the parties but also to the marketplace because the 
business’s costs savings are ultimately passed on to the 
consumer in the form of reduced prices or to the 
employee in the form of increased wages.  The debate 
                                                                                                             
(4) Mandatory arbitration undermines the development of public law 
because there is inadequate transparency and inadequate judicial 
review of arbitrators’ decisions. 
 
(5) Arbitration can be an acceptable alternative when consent to the 
arbitration is truly voluntary, and occurs after the dispute arises. 
Id. § 2.  This bill died in committee. 
16 Fellows, supra note 13. 
17 Keare, supra note 12, at 6.  In a study by the Administrative Office of the Courts, 
arbitration was estimated to save litigants about $957 per case, totaling an estimated 
$300,000.  Id. at 3  A consumer survey from 2005 found that about fifty-one percent of 609 
adults participating in arbitration believe it to be cheaper than litigation.  Sarah Rudolph 
Cole & Theodore H. Frank, The Current State of Consumer Arbitration, DISP. RESOL. MAG., Fall 
2008, at 30, 33. 
18 Keare, supra note 12, at 3. 
Marcum and Campbell: The Arbitration Seesaw:  Federal Act Preempts General Law Thereby
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2013
970 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47 
over arbitration usually fails to account for these indirect 
benefits.  It is important to point out that these indirect 
benefits are contingent on the enforceability of pre-
dispute agreements to arbitrate because it is assent to a 
pre-dispute arbitration agreement that lowers overall 
dispute resolution costs and thus enables businesses to 
offer lower prices and higher wages.19 
But, consumers criticize the shift away from judicial resolution to private 
resolution of civil disputes.  Gibson Vance, the President of the American 
Association for Justice, stated that, by virtue of the shift, 
 [t]he Supreme Court has allowed major corporations 
to grant themselves immunity when they cheat 
consumers or employees.  This decision leaves 
Americans with practically no recourse to challenge 
corporate wrongdoing and gives corporations a 
blueprint to draft forced arbitration clauses to avoid 
accountability for a wide range of unfair or illegal 
practices.20 
As a result, every lawyer will now advise business entities to utilize 
arbitration agreements containing class action waivers,21 which 
theoretically would allow an overall contract breach with impunity 
when individual consumer losses are too small for individual arbitration 
claims.22  Small recoveries do not encourage an individual to bring a sole 
action, and, as a result, 
putative defendants can engage in low stakes frauds and 
law violations with impunity and, if the number of 
occurrences is large enough, quite profitably.  Not 
                                                 
19 Fellows, supra note 13. 
20 Vance, supra note 8. 
21 Professor Paul F. Kirgis of St. John’s University School of Law has stated, “I would 
submit that any attorney who does not now advise her business clients to put arbitration 
agreements in all consumer contracts risks a finding of legal malpractice.”  Kimberly A. 
Kralowec, Blogosphere Commentary on AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, THE UCL 
PRACTITIONER (May 2, 2011, 5:00 AM), http://www.uclpractitioner.com/2011/05/ 
blogosphere-commentary-on-att-mobility-v-concepcion.html. 
22 See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1761 (2011) (Breyer, J., joined 
by Ginsburg, Sotomayor & Kagan, J.J., dissenting) (“What rational lawyer would have 
signed on to represent the Concepcions in litigation for the possibility of fees stemming 
from a $30.22 claim?”); see also, e.g., Carnegie v. Household Int’l, Inc., 376 F.3d 656, 661 (7th 
Cir. 2004) (“The realistic alternative to a class action is not 17 million individual suits, but 
zero individual suits, as only a lunatic or a fanatic sues for $30.”). 
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surprisingly, it has been an open secret for over a decade 
that a major motivation—“perhaps the dominant 
motivation”—for the imposition of arbitration clauses in 
adhesion contracts has been the hope that these clauses 
would blossom into class action waivers.23 
Another explanation for the judiciary’s shift from being historically 
hostile towards arbitration to embracing private arbitration is that jury 
awards are sometimes astronomical, leading to cries for legislative 
enactment of tort reform.  Such proposed statutes seek to limit the award 
of certain types of damages, particularly those of a punitive nature.24  
Calls for legislative reforms are often defeated through the lobbying 
efforts of the American Trial Lawyers Association; as such, the judiciary 
has taken up the sword and banner, accomplishing reform by 
encouraging and supporting arbitration agreements.25  These agreements 
contain contract language that achieves the same reform objectives.26  
                                                 
23 David S. Schwartz, Do-It-Yourself Tort Reform:  How the Supreme Court Quietly Killed the 
Class Action, SCOTUSBLOG (Sept. 16, 2011, 10:52 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2011/ 
09/do-it-yourself-tort-reform-how-the-supreme-court-quietly-killed-the-class-action/. 
24 See, e.g., Punitive Damages Reform, AM. TORT REFORM ASS’N, http://www.atra.org/ 
issues/punitive-damages-reform (last visited May 16, 2013) (illustrating state-by-state 
examples of limitations on punitive damages and exhibiting support for the limitation of 
punitive damages). 
25 David S. Schwartz, The Federal Arbitration Act and the Power of Congress over State 
Courts, 83 OR. L. REV. 541, 564 (2004) (noting that the “enforce[d] as written” approach by 
the U.S. Supreme Court has essentially allowed for tort reform).  Schwartz explains that 
under this “enforce[d] as written” approach, the drafting party creates an arbitration 
agreement with the opposing party, which typically conflicts with state contract 
regulations.  Id.  Because the arbitration clause is part of a federal mandate that is 
enforceable under the FAA, the conflicting state contract law is then preempted and the 
arbitration agreement is enforced.  Id.  Courts, in some cases, have expanded the ability of 
arbitrators to hear punitive damage claims.  Stephen J. Ware, Punitive Damages in 
Arbitration:  Contracting out of Government’s Role in Punishment and Federal Preemption of State 
Law, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 529, 529 (1994); see, e.g., Davis v. Prudential Sec., Inc., 59 F.3d 1186 
(11th Cir. 1995) (permitting a private arbitrator to award punitive damages).  Permitting 
arbitrators to hear claims on punitive damages is problematic because it is largely seen as a 
way to punish a party for conduct that is considered socially heinous.  Ware, supra, at 530.  
By allowing private arbitrators to determine punitive damage awards, the arbitrator is 
performing an action typically reserved for the public.  Id. 
26 See supra note 8 and accompanying text (citing concerns relating to using pre-dispute 
arbitration clauses in consumer and employment contracts).  The merger of tort reform and 
arbitration is most evidenced in the medical malpractice arena, where the growing use of 
private arbitration to accomplish tort reform was embraced by courts in mandating 
arbitration in medical malpractice suits.  See, e.g., Baker v. Sadick, 208 Cal. Rptr. 676 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 1984) (holding that an arbitration agreement to address any issue of medical 
malpractice included punitive damages).  Many allege that consumer debt arbitration 
systems are methods of do-it-yourself tort reform, because common consumer contracts for 
cell phones, credit cards, and auto loans agreements contain mandatory pre-dispute 
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While arbitration has fostered support both in the judiciary and among 
scholars, constitutional issues emerge when privatizing adjudication. 
B. Constitutional, Economic, and Social Concerns of Arbitration 
One of the most important issues that arises from the shift away 
from governmental adjudication and into private adjudication is a 
constitutional one.  The Seventh Amendment of the U.S. Constitution 
preserves the right to a trial by jury.27  One might argue that jury trials, 
comprised of fellow citizens, should determine factual disputes, rather 
than paid professional arbitrators who may be more interested in their 
fees than the disputes at hand.28  Arbitration clauses eliminate this 
fundamental right to a jury trial, which denies due process rights 
protected by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. 
As recently as June 2011, the West Virginia Supreme Court of 
Appeals agreed with this constitutional argument.  The court cited West 
Virginia’s Constitution, which preserves the right of the people to a jury 
trial with language identical to that of the Seventh Amendment.29  The 
court also criticized the U.S. Supreme Court’s “tendentious reasoning” to 
turn the FAA into substantive law that preempts most state law.30  The 
West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals stated that “Congress did not 
intend for arbitration agreements, adopted prior to an occurrence of 
negligence that results in a personal injury or wrongful death, and which 
require questions about the negligence be submitted to arbitration, to be 
                                                                                                             
arbitration clauses, thereby preventing the jury system from imposing large damage 
awards.  See generally Richard M. Alderman, Why We Really Need the Arbitration Fairness Act:  
It’s All About Separation of Powers, 12 J. CONSUMER & COM. L. 151 (2009) (discussing the 
problems associated with pre-dispute arbitration clauses for consumer contracts and why it 
is important for Congress to implement legislation to prohibit pre-dispute arbitration). 
27 U.S. CONST. amend. VII (“In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy 
shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by 
a jury, shall be otherwise reexamined in any court of the United States, than according to 
the rules of the common law.”). 
28 See, e.g., In re Nat’l Arbitration Forum Trade Practices Litig., 704 F. Supp. 2d 832, 835 
(D. Minn. 2010) (discussing how the bias of the National Arbitration Forum (“NAF”) 
arbitrators resulted in a high number of arbitrations being resolved in favor of creditors, 
rather than being dismissed).  The Minnesota Attorney General charged the NAF with 
several crimes including fraud, racketeering, deceptive and unfair trade practices, and 
tortious interference with contracts.  Id. at 836.  The parties settled and agreed for the 
defendants to pay $3.2 million to the plaintiffs.  In re Nat’l Arbitration Forum Trade 
Practices Litig., No. 09-1939 (PAM/JSM) (D. Minn. Apr. 28, 2011) (order granting 
preliminary injunction). 
29 Brown (ex rel. Brown) v. Genesis Healthcare Corp., 724 S.E.2d 250, 270 (W. Va. 2011), 
vacated 132 S. Ct. 1201 (2012). 
30 Id. at 278. 
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governed by the Federal Arbitration Act.”31  The court went on to say, 
“In essence, our Constitution recognizes that factual disputes should be 
decided by juries of lay citizens rather than paid, professional fact-
finders (arbitrators) who may be more interested in their fees than the 
disputes at hand.”32  Furthermore, the federal judiciary’s expansion of 
the FAA to encourage the use of arbitration, even when it raises issues of 
unconscionability and frustrates the protections of the Fifth, Seventh, 
and Fourteenth Amendments, appears to contradict concepts of 
federalism, which creates an affront to states’ rights.33 
This shift by the U.S. Supreme Court gives rise to a curious question:  
What ever happened to the conservatives’ rigid adherence to the concept 
of federalism?34  As stated by Justice Stephen Breyer in his dissenting 
opinion in AT&T Mobility: 
 By using the words “save upon such grounds as 
exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any 
contract,” Congress retained for the States an important 
                                                 
31 Id. at 262. 
32 Id. at 271. 
33 Recently, the U.S. Supreme Court overruled Brown ex rel. Brown, which had previously 
held that pre-dispute arbitration clauses in nursing home agreements were invalid.  
Marmet Health Care Ctr., Inc. v. Brown, 132 S. Ct. 1201, 1203 (2012).  The Supreme Court 
repeated its stance that state and federal courts must enforce the FAA with respect to all 
arbitration agreements.  Id.  The Court held that the West Virginia courts had misread and 
disregarded precedent in this area.  Id.  It further held that there were no exceptions for 
personal injury or wrongful death claims:  “When state law prohibits outright the 
arbitration of a particular type of claim, the analysis is straightforward:  The conflicting rule 
is displaced by the FAA.”  Id. (quoting AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 
1747 (2011)).  Yet, not all pre-dispute arbitration clauses are considered valid.  See, e.g., 
Noohi v. Toll Bros., Inc., 708 F.3d 599 (4th Cir. 2013) (finding pre-dispute arbitration 
between a real estate developing company and potential luxury homebuyers to be 
unenforceable where there was no mutual consideration, because only the buyer was 
required to submit disputes to arbitration but not the seller). 
34 See Dale B. Thompson, Immigration Policy Through the Lens of Optimal Federalism, 2 WM. 
& MARY POL’Y REV. 236, 237 (2011) (discussing further the concepts of federalism and 
preemption); Dale B. Thompson, Optimal Federalism Across Institutions:  Theory and 
Applications from Environmental and Health Care Policies., 40 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 437, 437 (2009) 
(analyzing when federal action is appropriate and when a problem would be better 
addressed by individual states); see, e.g., Amanda Terkel, The Federalist Society:  Where Are 
They Now?, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 18, 2010, 8:43 AM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/11/18/federalist-society-post-bush_n_785049.html 
(illustrating the growth of the Federalist Society and particularly its role during George W. 
Bush’s administration).  See generally Rosalie Berger Levinson, Will the New Federalism Be the 
Legacy of the Rehnquist Court?, 40 VAL. U. L. REV. 589, 590 (2006) (“[I]t cannot be denied that 
Justice Rehnquist presided over a major shift in U.S. law from the liberal Warren Court, 
and much of the conservative agenda was accomplished in the name of one overriding 
doctrine—federalism.”). 
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role incident to agreements to arbitrate.  Through those 
words Congress reiterated a basic federal idea that has 
long informed the nature of this Nation’s laws.  We have 
often expressed this ideal in opinions that set forth 
presumptions.  But federalism is as much a question of 
deeds as words.  It often takes the form of a concrete 
decision by this Court that respects the legitimacy of a 
State’s action in an individual case.  Here, recognition of 
that federalist ideal, embodied in specific language in 
this particular statute, [the FAA], should lead us to 
uphold California’s law, not to strike it down.  We do 
not honor federalist principles in their breach.35 
 There is one last point to be made about the economic and social 
consequences of this shift in policy.  It will affect all types of consumer 
agreements, employment contracts, insurance contracts, franchise 
agreements, health provider agreements—the list is endless.  Arbitration 
agreements can affect tort law, contract law, and certain statutory 
rights.36  Due to the policy shift exhibited by the Court, Congress 
renewed its support for the Arbitration Fairness Act.37  It also 
empowered the creation of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau in 
section 1028 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Financial Protection Act, which prohibits pre-dispute arbitration 
agreements altogether or imposes conditions or limitations on the use of 
                                                 
35 AT&T Mobility, 131 S. Ct. at 1762 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
36 See Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 111–12 (2001) (noting the FAA’s 
language includes contract law, including language pertaining to employment contracts); 
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler–Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985) (“By 
agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the substantive rights 
afforded by the statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than judicial 
form.”); Morrison v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 317 F.3d 646, 672–73 (6th Cir. 2003) (finding 
that an arbitration agreement was not enforceable for tort law, particularly claims alleging 
race and sex discrimination). 
37 The Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009, H.R. 1020, 111th Cong. (2009).  The original 
Arbitration Fairness Act notes that the FAA is limited to disputes among commercial 
entities with similar sophistication and bargaining power.  Id. § 2.  The bill goes on to say 
that “[p]rivate arbitration companies are sometimes under great pressure to devise systems 
that favor the corporate repeat players who decide whether those companies will receive 
their lucrative business.”  Id. § 2(4).  The Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009, however, died in 
Committee.  The Arbitration Fairness Act was reintroduced on May 12, 2011, which some 
believe was a direct response to the AT&T Mobility case.  Arbitration Fairness Act of 2011, 
S. 987, 112th Cong. (2011); see supra note 15 (explaining how the Arbitration Fairness Act of 
2011 was re-introduced in Congress, though ultimately the bill was not successful). 
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such agreements.38  In addition to Congress, federal courts have also 
embraced arbitration agreements.  Yet, these holdings have been 
inconsistent and problematic. 
III.  A FINE STATE OF AFFAIRS39—ANOMALY OF RECENT DECISIONS 
Recently, the U.S. Supreme Court has reviewed challenges to 
arbitration clauses in a number of cases.  Yet the Court’s argument as to 
the validity of arbitration agreements has been erratic.  In Buckeye Check 
Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, for example, the Court held that when there is 
an arbitration clause in a contract, “a challenge to the validity of the 
contract as a whole, and not specifically to the arbitration clause, must go 
to the arbitrator.”40  The Court re-emphasized that point, stating that 
“unless the challenge is to the arbitration clause itself, the issue of the 
                                                 
38 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 
124 Stat. 2003–04 (2010) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5518(b) (2012)).  According to section 
1028(a): 
The Bureau . . . may prohibit . . . the use of an agreement between a 
covered person and a consumer for a consumer financial product or 
service providing for arbitration of any future dispute between the 
parties, if the Bureau finds that such a prohibition . . . is in the public 
interest and for the protection of consumers. 
Id.  See generally Catherine Moore, Note, The Effect of the Dodd-Frank Act on Arbitration 
Agreements:  A Proposal for Consumer Choice, 12 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 503 (2012) (discussing 
arbitration agreements in the context of securities disputes).  The new “Consumer Czar,” 
Richard Cordray, was recently appointed to the position of head of the Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau, which may, by virtue of future regulations, curb practices that adversely 
affect consumers.  Eyder Peralta, New Consumer Czar:  ‘This is a Valid Appointment,’ NPR 
(Jan. 5, 2012, 5:28 PM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-way/2012/01/05/144753031/ 
new-consumer-czar-this-is-a-valid-appointment.  The Dodd-Frank Act has been criticized 
for being an incomplete framework for consumer protection and corporate responsibility.  
See generally Eric C. Chaffee, The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act:  
A Failed Vision for Increasing Consumer Protection and Heightening Corporate Responsibility in 
International Financial Transactions, 60 AM. U. L. REV. 1431 (2011) (arguing that the Dodd-
Frank Act is cracked and fragmented because it fails to consider globalization and creates 
problems for consumers).  Under the Dodd Frank Act, mandatory pre-dispute arbitration 
between broker-dealers and customers is also prohibited, as are pre-dispute arbitration 
claims involving whistle-blowers.  23A THOMAS L. HAZEN & JERRY W. MARKHAM, BROKER-
DEALER OPERATIONS SEC. & COMM. LAW § 12:14.50 (2012); see 15 U.S.C. § 78o(o) (2006) (“The 
Commission . . . may prohibit, or impose conditions or limitations on the use of, 
agreements that require customers or clients of any broker, dealer, or municipal securities 
dealer to arbitrate any future dispute between them . . . .”); 12 U.S.C. § 5567(d)(2) (2006) 
(“[N]o predispute arbitration agreement shall be valid or enforceable to the extent that it 
requires arbitration of a dispute arising under this section.”). 
39 As frequently stated by the early American slapstick comedy duo, Stan Laurel and 
Oliver Hardy, “Here’s another nice mess you’ve gotten me into.”  ROBERT ANDREWS, 
FAMOUS LINES:  A COLUMBIA DICTIONARY OF FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 389 (1997). 
40 Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 449 (2006). 
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contract’s validity is considered by the arbitrator in the first instance.”41  
This decision authorizes the courts, not the arbitrators, to decide issues 
regarding the validity of an arbitration agreement in a contract,42 unless 
the language of the arbitration clause explicitly permits the arbitrators to 
decide the validity of the arbitration clause and the contract as a whole.43  
In accord with the Buckeye decision, numerous courts have addressed the 
validity of arbitration agreements contained in a contract, often holding 
that such clauses are unconscionable and thus unenforceable—this also 
was one of the issues that the Ninth Circuit decided in AT&T Mobility.44 
But, in the decision reached by the Supreme Court in AT&T Mobility, 
courts may no longer rely on principles of general law when reviewing 
an arbitration agreement if such principles would “stand as an obstacle 
to the accomplishment of the FAA’s objectives.”45  If such an obstacle of 
general law exists, then one could argue that almost all general law 
defenses to enforcement of a well-drafted arbitration agreement would 
be futile, as they would have a disproportionate impact on arbitration 
agreements and thus would be preempted by the FAA. 
However, such may not be an accurate reading of the AT&T Mobility 
decision.  When substantive federal laws—for example, the FAA—and 
substantive state laws conflict, as they have regarding the validity of 
arbitration agreements, then a question arises as to the precise meaning 
and scope of the recent AT&T Mobility decision. 
The final sentence in the AT&T Mobility opinion reads, “Because it 
‘stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full 
purposes and objectives of Congress,’ California’s Discover Bank rule is 
preempted by the FAA.”46  This creates a question as to which general 
                                                 
41 Id. at 445–46. 
42 Thibodeau v. Comcast Corp., 912 A.2d 874, 887 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2006) (holding that a 
bar on class-wide proceedings rendered an arbitration agreement unconscionable and 
unenforceable). 
43 Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772, 2778–79 (2010) (ruling that when 
an arbitration agreement delegates to the arbitrator the authority to determine whether the 
agreement should be arbitrated, claims that challenge the enforceability and validity of 
such agreement as a whole will be determined by the arbitrator, while claims that 
specifically challenge the enforcement of the delegation provision will be considered by the 
court). 
44 See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1745 (2011) (explaining that 
the Ninth Circuit held the arbitration provision was unconscionable (citing Laster v. AT&T 
Mobility LLC, 584 F.3d 849, 855 (9th Cir. 2009)); see also, e.g., Lowden v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 
512 F.3d 1213, 1219 (9th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted) (applying Washington state law to find 
class action waivers unconscionable and unenforceable); Thibodeau, 912 A.2d at 886–87 
(applying Pennsylvania and Massachusetts state laws to find a ban on class action suits 
unconscionable and unenforceable). 
45 AT&T Mobility, 131 S. Ct. at 1753 (citations omitted). 
46 Id. (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)). 
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laws are preempted by the FAA and how far such preemption will go to 
preclude an invalidation of an arbitration agreement.  The Discover Bank 
rule provides that arbitration provisions would be deemed 
unconscionable when one party is found to have superior bargaining 
power and has instituted an arbitration agreement to prevent class 
actions in cases that would not be economically beneficial to pursue for 
individuals (i.e., cases involving small amounts of damages).47  The 
Court seemed to suggest that it is not established that bilateral 
arbitration (i.e., one-on-one) adequately substituted for the deterrent 
effects of class actions.48  The Discover Bank rule deemed arbitration 
agreements that contain a prohibition on class actions—known as 
collective-arbitration waivers—unconscionable under California general 
law and under the state’s civil code.49  However, the U.S. Supreme Court 
reversed the Ninth Circuit and held that “[w]hen state law prohibits 
outright the arbitration of a particular type of claim, the analysis is 
straightforward:  The conflicting rule is displaced by the FAA.”50  Thus, a 
general state law that bans class action waivers in arbitration agreements 
would be unconscionable and unenforceable because, according to the 
U.S. Supreme Court, the ban would have a disproportionate impact on 
such agreements, and ultimately the FAA would preempt it.   
The decision in AT&T Mobility raises more questions about the 
applicability of the ruling than it answers.  Is the holding simply that this 
particular general law in California, namely the Discover Bank holding, 
was preempted and nothing more?  Or are we to wait for more cases to 
test whether other general law defenses to contracts operate in a way 
that has a disproportionate impact on arbitration agreements?  Is 
“disproportionate impact” now the test to be applied? Or has the AT&T 
Mobility decision already applied that test and indicated where the test 
                                                 
47 Id. at 1746. 
48 Id.  The reasoning of the Discover Bank rule, as stated by the California Supreme Court, 
was quoted by the U.S. Supreme Court as follows: 
[W]hen the waiver is found in a consumer contract of adhesion in a 
setting in which disputes between the contracting parties predictably 
involve small amounts of damages, and when it is alleged that the 
party with the superior bargaining power has carried out a scheme to 
deliberately cheat large numbers of consumers out of individually 
small sums of money, then . . . the waiver becomes in practice the 
exemption of the party ‘from responsibility for [its] own fraud, or 
willful injury to the person or property of another.’  Under these 
circumstances, such waivers are unconscionable under California law 
and should not be enforced. 
Id. (quoting Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 1110 (Cal. 2005)) 
(alterations in original). 
49 Discover Bank, 113 P.3d at 1103. 
50 AT&T Mobility, 131 S. Ct. at 1747 (citation omitted). 
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has been met so as to preempt state law?  These questions show that the 
future of the AT&T Mobility holding is uncertain. 
Despite the last sentence in AT&T Mobility suggesting that the 
decision is applicable solely to the Discover Bank rule, it is necessary to 
look at the full body of the AT&T Mobility majority opinion, because the 
Court provided examples of applying general laws that would have a 
“disproportionate impact” on the FAA.51  Although some may view 
these examples as simply disingenuous dicta that muddied the water, 
others may argue that the Court’s examples operate as a binding 
preclusion of any lower courts’ review of the legality of arbitration 
agreements on general law principles.  Enumerating the examples in the 
opinion thus nullifies the effectiveness of the Buckeye opinion.52  Lower 
courts are precluded from invalidating arbitration agreements based on 
substantive and, in some cases, procedural unconscionability. 
Consequently, scholars and courts analyzing and applying the AT&T 
Mobility decision appear to disagree as to its scope and its effect on lower 
courts’ review of arbitration agreements, which is permitted by the 
Buckeye decision.  Some argue that AT&T Mobility completely precludes 
                                                 
51 Id. 
52 If the test of “disproportionate impact” is applicable to all of the examples given in the 
opinion, then there is nothing left for lower courts to review in consideration of the legality 
of provisions in arbitration agreements.  Thus, the Buckeye decision essentially becomes 
ineffective.  The Supreme Court gave the following examples in the AT&T Mobility case: 
 An obvious illustration . . . would be a case finding 
unconscionable or unenforceable as against public policy consumer 
arbitration agreements that fail to provide for judicially monitored 
discovery. . . . A [lower] court might reason that no consumer would 
knowingly waive his right to full discovery, as this would enable 
companies to hide their wrongdoing.  Or the [lower] court might 
simply say that such agreements are exculpatory—restricting 
discovery would be of greater benefit to the company than the 
consumer, since the former is more likely to be sued than to sue.  And, 
the reasoning would continue, because such a rule applies the general 
principle of unconscionability or public-policy disapproval of 
exculpatory agreements, it is applicable to “any” contract and thus 
preserved by § 2 of the FAA.  In practice of course, the rule would have 
a disproportionate impact on arbitration agreements; but it would 
presumably apply to contracts purporting to restrict discovery in 
litigation as well. 
 Other examples are easy to imagine.  The same argument might 
apply to a rule classifying as unconscionable arbitration agreements 
that fail to abide by the Federal Rules of Evidence, or that disallow an 
ultimate disposition by a jury (perhaps termed “a panel of twelve lay 
arbitrators” to help avoid preemption). 
Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted). 
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application of general law to arbitration agreements.53  If so, then the 
Buckeye decision becomes a nullity.  Others appear to be unconvinced.54  
Still others opine that dual readings of the decision exist and that the 
decision can be read narrowly even if the Supreme Court intended a 
broader interpretation.55  Before the AT&T Mobility decision, however, 
there was a drastically different process for reviewing arbitration, which 
took general law into account. 
IV.  THE EVOLUTION OF ARBITRATION CLAUSES AND THE FINALITY OF THE 
ARBITRATION AWARD 
To understand the irregularities in the present state of affairs, it is 
necessary to review the history of arbitration.  Around the mid-twentieth 
century, there began an explosive expansion of the arbitral process, 
which was generally sanctioned by the courts.56  In private arbitration, 
                                                 
53 See, e.g., Mike Appleton, AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion:  Has Consumer Protection Law 
Been Preempted?, JOHNATHAN TURLEY (July 3, 2011), http://jonathanturley.org/2011/07/ 
03/att-mobility-v-concepcion-has-consumer-protection-law-been-preempted/. 
54 Recent decisions in cases demonstrate that lower courts continue to find exceptions to 
the preemption doctrine.  In re DirecTV Early Cancellation Fee Mktg. & Sales Practices 
Litig., 810 F. Supp. 2d 1060, 1072–73 (C.D. Cal. 2011) (holding that state law remains valid 
notwithstanding the AT&T Mobility LLC decision), abrogated by Kilgore v. KeyBank, Nat’l 
Ass’n, 673 F.3d 947, 960, 963 (9th Cir. 2012); Plows v. Rockwell Collins, Inc., 812 F. Supp. 2d 
1063, 1069 (C.D. Cal. 2011)). 
55 See Colin P. Marks, The Irony of AT&T v. Concepcion, 87 IND. L.J. SUPP. 31, 32 (2012) 
(discussing how the opinion is open to multiple interpretations and can be read narrowly 
and broadly); see also Sanchez v. Valencia Holding Co., 135 Cal. Rptr. 3d 19, 31 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 2011) (striking down an arbitration agreement containing a class waiver clause on the 
ground of unconscionability and stating that the agreement was a contract of adhesion and 
unfairly one-sided); Brown v. Ralphs Grocery Co., 128 Cal. Rptr. 3d 854, 860–61 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 2011) (invalidating a class-action waiver in an arbitration agreement as it was applied 
to a representative action under a state statute that allowed a plaintiff to bring an action on 
behalf of other employees to enforce the Labor Code, distinguishing the representative 
actions from class actions). 
56 Jay R. Sever, Comment, The Relaxation of Inarbitrability and Public Policy Checks on U.S. 
and Foreign Arbitration:  Arbitration out of Control?, 65 TUL. L. REV. 1661, 1667–68 (1991). 
 American courts, led by recent landmark decisions of the U.S. 
Supreme Court, have moved from a hostile and jealous attitude 
towards the institution of arbitration to allowing and enforcing almost 
any arbitration agreement or award of international commercial 
character, regardless of whether it comports with traditional 
arbitrability and public policy standards.  The Court enunciated a 
major rationale for its liberal attitude in The Bremen when it noted that 
courts should honor the “ancient concepts of freedom of contract.”  A 
more recent . . .  undercurrent in the Court’s rationale is a nearly 
absolute deference to arbitration, apparently for purposes of judicial 
efficiency. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
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disputing parties agree to arbitrate.  Parties enter into these agreements 
either before any dispute arises or after a dispute begins.  The pre-
dispute agreements to arbitrate are usually clauses in larger contracts.  
Many arbitration clauses contain choice-of-law provisions designating 
the law of a particular state to govern disputes.  Once an arbitration 
award is made, it is difficult to reverse it on appeal to a court.  
Nevertheless, the loser of the arbitration hearing may choose to appeal 
the decision to the courts or defy the arbitrator’s decision.57 
Typically, a reviewing court can only reverse an arbitration award 
based upon very specific and limited reasons, such as when:  (1) the 
award was maintained by corruption or fraud; (2) the arbitrator was not 
impartial; (3) the arbitrator exceeded his authority; (4) the arbitrator 
unreasonably refused to postpone the hearing or hear material evidence; 
or (5) there was no arbitration agreement.58  The FAA does not allow for 
an appeal on the merits of an arbitration award but rather allows only 
judicial review of procedural errors. 59  In Hall Street Associates, L.L.C. v. 
Mattel, Inc., the U.S. Supreme Court invalidated the expanding efforts of 
review by lower courts, holding that the grounds listed in the FAA are 
the exclusive grounds available for reviewing an arbitration award.60  
Yet, many federal appellate courts have pronounced additional grounds 
for review of arbitration decisions, including review for disregard of law, 
public policy, irrationality, and arbitrariness.61 
In 1984, the U.S. Supreme Court essentially federalized arbitration in 
Southland Corp. v. Keating, finding that the FAA constituted substantive 
federal law, which thereby preempted any contradictory or conflicting 
state law from curtailing certain aspects of arbitration availability and 
procedures.62  The Keating decision served to close one more avenue of 
                                                 
57 Stephen J. Ware, Default Rules from Mandatory Rules:  Privatizing Law Through 
Arbitration, 83 MINN. L. REV. 703, 708 (1999).  Should the loser choose the road of defiance, 
the winner must petition the court for an order confirming the award.  Id. 
58 See, e.g., 710 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/12(a) (West 2007) (providing the scenarios 
where the court will vacate an arbitration award). 
59 9 U.S.C. § 10(a) (2006). 
60 Hall Street Assocs., LLC v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 590 (2008).  The Court noted that 
there may be other ways for courts to review cases in other sections of the FAA, but for 
sections 9, 10, and 11, the FAA grounds listed for review are exclusive.  Id. 
61 Stephen L. Hayford, A New Paradigm for Commercial Arbitration:  Rethinking the 
Relationship Between Reasoned Awards and the Judicial Standard for Vacatur, 66 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 443, 461–62 (1998).  The courts rely on section 2 of the FAA to determine the 
enforceability of arbitration agreements “upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for 
the revocation of a contract.”  Revelation, Reaction and Reflection, supra note 4. 
62 Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 12 (1984) (“We thus read the underlying issue 
of arbitrability to be a question of substantive federal law:  ‘Federal law in the terms of the 
Arbitration Act governs that issue in either state or federal court.’” (quoting Moses H. Cone 
Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983))). 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 47, No. 4 [2013], Art. 6
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol47/iss4/6
2013] The Arbitration Seesaw 981 
protections within the private arbitration processes.  Then, in Mitsubishi 
Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler–Plymouth, Inc., the Court allowed for the 
arbitration of statutory rights, which was followed by Circuit City Stores, 
Inc. v. Adams, where the Court applied this analysis to the employment 
dispute arena.63  
As a result of the Court’s decisions over the past fifty years, it has 
been said repeatedly that the process of arbitration, and the power 
afforded to that process, is lawless.  The process itself has been described 
as a “legal black hole.”64  This notion of lawlessness becomes even more 
apparent when examining judicial review under the FAA. 
V.  ABROGATION OF JUDICIAL REVIEW OF THE FAA 
Judicial review is one of the cornerstone principles of our legal 
system.  In the United States, the courts serve as the supreme protector of 
the rights of individuals.  Since the monumental case of Marbury v. 
Madison, the courts have reviewed the actions of the government to 
ensure that the rights of individuals are not improperly impaired.65  
Chief Justice John Marshall stated that “[i]t is emphatically the province 
and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”66 
Arbitrators may substitute their concepts of fairness for the law, but 
they generally follow common law and statutory law in making their 
decisions.  However, courts regularly emphasize that arbitrators are not 
obligated to follow the law when deciding a case or reaching an award.67  
                                                 
63 See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985) 
(explaining that parties may choose the arbitration process over judicial review unless 
Congress says otherwise, because it is simplistic, informal, and expeditious); see also Circuit 
City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 119 (2001) (stating that if Congress intended to 
exclude all employment contracts from the FAA, then Congress would include that 
language in the FAA).  The Court found that § 1 of the FAA exempted only employment 
contracts of transportation workers, disagreeing with the Court of Appeals, which 
interpreted § 1 to exclude all employment contracts.  Id. 
64 Appleton, supra note 53. 
65 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
66 Id. at 177. 
67 See Ware, supra note 57, at 720 n.82 (citing to New York cases finding that arbitrators 
are not bound by rules of law unless the arbitration agreement requires it); see also Kenneth 
S. Abraham & J.W. Montgomery, III, The Lawlessness of Arbitration, 9 CONN. INS. L.J. 355, 357 
(2003) (noting that arbitration operates with a sort of “contractual lawlessness”); Richard 
M. Alderman, Consumer Arbitration:  The Destruction of the Common Law, 2 J. AM. ARB. 1, 11 
(2003) (“Even assuming an arbitrator is committed to following the law, however, he or she 
cannot make it.  Therein lies the problem. . . . Arbitration eliminates litigation in a public 
forum, precedent-establishing decisions, and stare decisis.”) (footnotes omitted); Barbara 
Black & Jill I. Gross, Making It up as They Go Along:  The Role of Law in Securities Arbitration, 
23 CARDOZO L. REV. 991, 1040 (2002) (“While it seems that an investor may have difficulty 
prevailing in court under the established law, arbitration panels, on more than an 
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For example, in Perini Corporation v. Greate Bay Hotel & Casino, Inc., a 
dispute arose between a casino and its construction contractor regarding 
their contract.68  The dispute went to arbitration, where a panel of 
arbitrators decided in favor of the casino and awarded it lost profits.69  
On appeal, the contractors argued that the parties did not contemplate 
lost profit damages in the contract, and thus the arbitrators did not 
follow existing law.70  The court affirmed the arbitrator’s decision and 
held that the asserted errors of law did not warrant judicial invalidation 
of the award, because they were not gross, unmistakable, or a manifest 
disregard of applicable law.71  In looking at the narrow grounds for 
overturning an arbitration decision, the court stated, “Obviously a 
mistake of law is not one of the stated grounds for vacating an award.  
Nor, indeed, is sufficiency of the evidence.”72  The New Jersey Supreme 
Court upheld the arbitrator’s award.73 
In a second case, St. John’s Mercy Medical Center v. Delfino, the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that a court could only 
overturn an arbitrator’s award if the arbitrator was fully aware of the 
existence of a clearly defined governing legal principle and refused to 
apply it (known as the “manifest disregard doctrine”).74  The Eighth 
Circuit found that since the arbitrator, in the case at hand, clearly failed 
to cite the relevant contract law and then disregarded it, the manifest 
disregard doctrine did not apply.75  Thus, the Eighth Circuit held that the 
lower court erred in substituting its remedial judgment for the arbitrator, 
because no contract law reason was actually cited by the court.76 
In a third case, the court reinforced the doctrine of stare decisis: 
                                                                                                             
occasional basis, are reaching decisions favorable to investors even where the ‘law is clear’ 
that there is no basis for imposing liability on the broker.”); Edward Brunet, Toward 
Changing Models of Securities Arbitration, 62 BROOK. L. REV. 1459, 1484 (1996) (“The arbitrator 
need not apply substantive legal principles.  The old ‘manifest disregard’ of the law 
standard appears close to dead.”) (footnotes omitted); Jennifer J. Johnson, Wall Street Meets 
the Wild West:  Bringing Law and Order to Securities Arbitration, 84 N.C. L. REV. 123, 140 (2005) 
(“[T]here is no meaningful judicial oversight to ensure that arbitrators are applying the 
law, and limited evidence on the ground suggests that SRO [“Self Regulatory 
Organization”] panels may not in fact apply the law.”) (footnotes omitted). 
68 Perini Corp. v. Greate Bay Hotel & Casino, Inc., 610 A.2d 364, 366 (N.J. 1992). 
69 Id. at 368. 
70 Id. 
71 Id. at 366, 368 (“[T]he arbitrators had not committed ‘the kind of gross mistake or clear 
disregard of applicable law that is required to overturn an award.’”). 
72 Id. at 370. 
73 Id. at 384. 
74 St. John’s Mercy Med. Ctr. v. Delfino, 414 F.3d 882, 884 (8th Cir. 2005). 
75 Id. 
76 Id. at 885. 
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 At common law, the courts have almost uniformly 
refused to vacate an arbitrator’s award because of an 
error of law or fact.  It has been held that the arbitrator is 
the final judge of both law and facts, and that an award 
will not be set aside except upon a clear showing of 
fraud, misconduct or some other irregularity rendering 
the award unjust, inequitable, or unconscionable[] and 
that even a grossly erroneous decision is binding in the 
absence of fraud. 77 
Much of the current discussion and criticism about arbitration concerns 
the absence of stare decisis principles in private arbitration decision-
making.  Attorney practitioners voice many concerns about this 
situation: 
One of the most distinguishing characteristics of an 
arbitration proceeding is the absence of stare decisis, 
meaning “the policy of the court to stand by precedent.”  
Instead, a decision made during one proceeding will not 
affect the decision in a following, similar proceeding.  In 
other words, arbitration lacks the deterrent of an 
unfavorable court decision having been issued.  Thus, 
even if a managed care company is proven wrong in one 
hearing, it may not alter its practice, since a future 
arbitration will begin with a clean slate.78 
Arbitration is a confidential process.  Due to this, arbitration decisions do 
not establish case precedent.79  This concern becomes particularly 
troublesome when an arbitrator’s case is one of first impression, or the 
lower courts have conflicted over it.80  Further, arbitration awards are 
generally not published.  In fact, in many arbitration proceedings, the 
parties have an obligation to keep both the proceedings and final 
outcome of the arbitration confidential.81  As such, the decision of one 
                                                 
77 Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Local Union No. 200, 330 N.E.2d 703, 708 (Ohio 1975) 
(citations omitted). 
78 Maria Pepe VanDerLaan & David G. Jordan, Modern Arbitration Clauses Place Health 
Care Providers into Unanticipated Corner, SAXE DOERNBERGER & VITA, P.C., 
http://www.sdvlaw.com/images/Arbitration_Pitfalls__SDV.Unabridged.pdf (last visited 
May 16, 2013). 
79 Abraham & Montgomery, supra note 67, at 360. 
80 Id. at 363. 
81 See Alderman, supra note 67, at 11 (“Even when published and made available to the 
public, the decision of one arbitrator, or a panel of arbitrators, is in no way binding on any 
other arbitrator or panel.”); Charles L. Knapp, Taking Contracts Private:  The Quiet Revolution 
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arbitration panel has no binding or precedential effect on other 
arbitration panels, nor should it. 
Recent cases from the Supreme Court have further complicated the 
issue concerning arbitration in its interpretation of the FAA’s authority 
over state and common law. 
VI.  RECENT POSTURING OF THE SUPREME COURT TOWARDS TOTAL 
PREEMPTION 
States have continuously struggled with the idea of replacing 
traditional litigation with alternative dispute resolution, particularly 
arbitration.82  Some states, in response to the increase in the use of 
arbitration, have enacted laws regulating arbitration; however, the FAA 
has preempted many of these laws.83  The concept of federal preemption 
is derived from the U.S. Constitution: 
 This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States 
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all 
Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the 
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law 
of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound 
thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any 
State to the Contrary notwithstanding.84 
The U.S. Supreme Court has used this provision to hold any state law 
unconstitutional that conflicts with a federal law.85  In the case of private 
arbitration, judicial decisions and state arbitration statutes act as the state 
law that conflicts with the FAA, the applicable federal law.86  In 
determining whether a particular federal law preempts state law, the 
U.S. Supreme Court examines legislative intent.87 
In the case of Southland Corp. v. Keating, the U.S. Supreme Court held 
that the FAA was not only applicable in state court proceedings, but also 
                                                                                                             
in Contract Law, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 761, 785 (2002) (“[O]nce the case is decided by the 
arbitrators, it will furnish no precedent by which future decision-makers—whether judges or 
other arbitrators—will be guided.  Past decisions in arbitration furnish no reliable guide to 
the present and present decisions serve as no reliable guide to the future.”). 
82 See Christopher R. Drahozal, Federal Arbitration Act Preemption, 79 IND. L.J. 393, 394 
(2004) (noting the ongoing struggle states are having as they adapt to using arbitration 
rather than litigation). 
83 Id. at 395. 
84 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
85 Drahozal, supra note 82, at 397. 
86 See id. (explaining how conflict preemption operates between state and federal law). 
87 Id. 
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held that § 2 of the FAA preempted conflicting state law.88  This 
California case involved convenience store franchisees who alleged that 
the franchisor violated the California Franchise Investment Law by 
seeking to compel arbitration of the contract dispute.89  After this case, 
states could no longer require a judicial forum for the resolution of 
disputes, and, pursuant to the opinion of the Court, arbitration offered 
an equally valid forum for the resolution of disputes.90  The Court 
justified preemption by finding that it helped reverse long-time judicial 
hostility towards arbitration and reaffirmed the right of individuals to 
contract without court interference.91 
The U.S. Supreme Court has in its decisions consistently reaffirmed 
its commitment to arbitration and the preemption of the state statutes by 
the FAA.  In the case of Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, the Court 
upheld the enforceability of an arbitration clause in a contract, despite 
the claim that the underlying contract was both illegal and void.92  
Buckeye, the check cashing company, sought to compel arbitration, but 
the trial court held that a court rather than an arbitrator should decide if 
the underlying contract was illegal.93  On appeal, the decision was 
reversed, because the Cardegnas were not actually challenging the 
arbitration clause; rather, they had challenged the high interest rates of 
the contract.94  The U.S. Supreme Court held that the arbitrator was 
empowered to decide the validity of the entire contract, and a court 
would only be necessary if the parties challenged the arbitration clause 
itself.95  Justice Thomas dissented in the Buckeye case: 
 I remain of the view that the Federal Arbitration Act 
(FAA), 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq., does not apply to proceedings 
in state courts.  Thus, in state-court proceedings, the 
FAA cannot be the basis for displacing a state law that 
prohibits enforcement of an arbitration clause contained 
in a contract that is unenforceable under state law.  
Accordingly, I would leave undisturbed the judgment of 
the Florida Supreme Court.96 
                                                 
88 Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 16 (1984). 
89 Id. at 3–4. 
90 Lawrence Waddington, Federalizing Arbitration, L.A. LAW., Sept. 2003, at 30, 31. 
91 Id. 
92 Buckeye Check Cashing v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 449 (2006). 
93 Id. at 443. 
94 Id. 
95 See id. at 449 (holding that a challenge on the whole of the contract must go to the 
arbitrator). 
96 Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
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 More recently, in AT&T Mobility, LLC v. Concepcion, the Court struck 
down a California Supreme Court decision that found an arbitration 
clause unconscionable under state law.97  The Concepcions received a 
free telephone from AT&T, but AT&T required them to pay a California 
tax in the amount of $30.22.98  AT&T’s consumer contract contained an 
arbitration clause.99  With this decision by the Court, it seems as if the 
Buckeye decision allowing for courts to review the legality of arbitration 
clauses has been nullified. 
The 5–4 decision authored by Justice Scalia, held that, pursuant to 
the FAA, California must enforce arbitration agreements even when the 
agreement requires consumers to arbitrate their complaints individually, 
instead of as a class.100  According to the Court, the test used by 
California state courts to determine the unconscionability of an 
arbitration clause, requiring waiver of a class-action, was preempted by 
the FAA even if the underlying contract was potentially fraudulent or 
was related to false advertising.101  The Court found that the FAA 
preempted the state law because the state law singled out arbitration 
agreements, and the standard allowed them to find an arbitration 
agreement unconscionable more frequently than other contracts.102  The 
Court found that “[a]rbitration is a matter of contract, and the FAA 
requires courts to honor parties’ expectations.”103  It reasoned, 
The overarching purpose of the FAA, evident in the text 
of §§ 2, 3, and 4, is to ensure the enforcement of 
arbitration agreements according to their terms so as to 
facilitate streamlined proceedings.  Requiring the 
availability of classwide arbitration interferes with 
fundamental attributes of arbitration and thus creates a 
scheme inconsistent with the FAA.104 
The Court found that California’s statute containing the no-class-waiver 
rule does not apply to “any contract” because it impedes the purpose of 
the FAA. 
                                                 
97 AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1753 (2011). 
98 Id. at 1744. 
99 Id. 
100 Id. 
101 See id. at 1753 (“States cannot require a procedure that is inconsistent with the FAA, 
even if it is desirable for unrelated reasons.”). 
102 Id. at 1746, 1753. 
103 Id. at 1752 (citing Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772, 2774 (2010)). 
104 Id. at 1748 (Breyer, Ginsburg, Sotomayor, Kagan, J.J., dissenting). 
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The dissent in this case identified an important principle missed by 
the majority opinion—state sovereignty.  They noted, 
 By using the words “save upon such grounds as 
exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any 
contract,” . . . Congress reiterated a basic federal idea 
that has long informed the nature of this Nation’s 
laws. . . .  Here, recognition of that federalist ideal, 
embodied in specific language in this particular statute, 
should lead us to uphold California’s law, not to strike it 
down.  We do not honor federalist principles in their 
breach.105 
It would seem that the AT&T Mobility case has now removed the courts 
from conducting such a review of arbitration clauses for 
unconscionability and has essentially nullified the Buckeye holding.  Not 
only do recent cases present uncertainty as to the reviewability of 
arbitration clauses, but the interpretation of § 2 of the FAA also raises 
questions for the future of arbitration. 
VII.  THE MEANING OF § 2 OF THE FAA AND THE PHRASE “GENERAL LAW” 
Section 2 of the FAA states that arbitration clauses or agreements 
“shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as 
exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”106  The 
Supreme Court has further noted that “[s]ection 2 embodies the national 
policy favoring arbitration and places arbitration agreements on equal 
footing with all other contracts[.]”107  As such, 
 [a] written provision in . . . a contract . . . to settle by 
arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such 
contract . . . or an agreement in writing to submit to 
arbitration an existing controversy arising out of such a 
contract . . . shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, 
save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for 
the revocation of any contract.108 
                                                 
105 Id. at 1762. 
106 Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006). 
107 Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 443 (2006). 
108 Id. at 443–44 (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2). 
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Courts have used general contract defenses, such as fraud, duress, or 
unconscionability, to invalidate arbitration agreements without 
conflicting with § 2 of the FAA.109 
From the Buckeye case, the Court set out that challenges to the 
validity of arbitration agreements, “upon such grounds as exist at law or 
in equity for the revocation of any contract,” include two sets of cases.110  
One type specifically challenges the validity of the agreement to 
arbitrate.111  The other challenges the contract underlying the arbitration 
as a whole, either on a basis that directly affects the entire agreement 
(e.g., the agreement was fraudulently induced) or on the ground that the 
illegality of one of the provisions of the contract renders the whole 
contract invalid.112  The question remains as to whether the Buckeye 
decision remains applicable.  Historically, the doctrine has stated that the 
law of a particular state governs contract law while stipulating the 
grounds that may invalidate a contract.  Additionally, one of the main 
purposes of the FAA is “to overcome courts’ refusals to enforce 
agreements to arbitrate.”113  What remains unclear is whether there is 
any state law or general law that can be relied on for a court to invalidate 
an arbitration agreement. 
VIII.  CONCLUSION 
“Arbitration is power, and courts are forbidden to look behind it.”114  
The protection of arbitration awards against judicial interference and the 
development of organized arbitration have established “judicial powers” 
other than those provided in both the federal and state constitutions.  “It 
is not possible to maintain any legally established policy or order in 
domestic and international trade, whether it is an order of free 
competition protected by antitrust legislation or any other type of 
economic order provided by law, if courts abdicate their power in favor 
of private tribunals serving private interests.”115  American courts are 
presently conflicted with such private tribunals.  “In the face of the 
                                                 
109 Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 686–87 (1996). 
110 Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc., 546 U.S. at 444 (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2). 
111 See, e.g., Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984) (challenging the agreement 
to arbitrate as void under California law insofar as it purported to cover claims brought 
under the state’s Franchise Investment Law). 
112 Id.  The claim is the second type in this case.  The crux of the complaint is that the 
contract as a whole, including its arbitration provision, is rendered invalid by the usurious 
finance charge.  Id. 
113 Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 270 (1995) (citing Volt Info. Scis., 
Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 474 (1989)). 
114 Heinrich Kronstein, Arbitration Is Power, 38 N.Y.U. L. REV. 661, 699 (1963). 
115 Id. at 700. 
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current trends in our society, the central concept of a social regime 
whose exclusive ordering is the totality of legislative and judicial 
mandates[] has been weakened by the cession of segments of the law to 
organized arbitration.”116  As one scholar has explained, 
[D]enial of access to a court of law in most cases means 
exactly that—denial of access not merely to a court, or 
even to a jury, but to the law itself. . . . [A]rbitrators in 
most cases are not bound to follow the law, nor are their 
decisions appealable to a court of law for any but the 
most egregious of defects.  Mere failure to follow the law 
is not such a defect.  The result is that whatever the rules 
of law may be, arbitrators are not bound to follow them, 
and their handiwork is subject to only the most 
perfunctory of judicial oversight.  Arbitrators of course 
may choose to follow the law—nothing requires them 
not to—but if they do, it’s not because they have any 
obligation to do so, and it’s not something that a litigant 
or her attorney can count on going in.  Knowledgeable 
attorneys may have some sense of the approach that an 
arbitration panel is likely to take to a given type of case.  
Still, the arbitrators bring their own “law” with them, 
and they take it with them when they leave.117 
It would seem that the AT&T Mobility case now prevents courts from 
conducting such a review of arbitration clauses.  The teetering of the 
seesaw on the playground continues. 
There are renewed suggestions that arbitration decisions should 
undergo a process of judicial review.  First, and seemingly most simply, 
an arbitration agreement can include a provision that the award will be 
subject to judicial review.  Of course, this may be an unlikely measure for 
both parties to agree on.  But, if the arbitration agreement includes a 
requisite that the arbitrator follow the law, then it would seem that 
courts become empowered to review the award to assure that such has 
been done.118  Second, there is a growing call for a return to the process 
of judicial review by the courts, especially in view of the recent decisions 
                                                 
116 Id. 
117 Knapp, supra note 81, at 782–83 (footnote omitted omitted). 
118 See Christopher R. Drahozal, Contracting Around RUAA:  Default Rules, Mandatory 
Rules, and Judicial Review of Arbitral Awards, 3 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 419, 431–33 (2003). 
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of federal circuit courts regarding the scope of judicial review of 
arbitration awards.119 
If there is a reversal of the current favoritism toward the finality of 
arbitration awards, that reversal must come from the legal system—
either by the courts or through legislative action.  It remains to be seen 
whether the judiciary is willing to take on a task that it seems to be 
diligently avoiding, or whether Congress is willing to meet the financial 
demands of returning to greater judicial involvement.  The legal system 
must play together on the playground to protect the rights of the people.  
As it stands now under recent rulings by the U.S. Supreme Court, 
privatization is the name of the game, and fairness, it appears, be 
damned.  The best take-away conclusion that can be offered at this point 
is this:  Congress could seriously reconsider the FAA so as to preclude 
pre-dispute arbitration agreements, or the newly created Consumer Czar 
could propose administrative rules to be enacted by the Consumer 
Financial Protection Bureau that potentially may curb practices that 
adversely affect consumers.120 
The legal profession recognizes the need for safeguards in this 
unregulated dispute resolution arena called arbitration and has devised 
procedures to introduce a protective process so as to avoid a complete 
disregard of judicial review.  The American Bar Association, National 
Association of Arbiters, and the American Arbitration Association have 
established protocols for arbitration, which could help with the 
privatization of dispute issues.  Both the American Arbitration 
Association121 and the National Academy of Arbiters have annunciated 
due process procedures to be incorporated into the arbitration process.122  
If properly implemented, these procedures will call into question certain 
unfair clauses in arbitration agreements, such as prohibitions on class 
actions, punitive damages, the admissibility of evidence, and publication 
of arbitration awards. 
                                                 
119 See generally Sarah Rudolph Cole, Revising the FAA to Permit Expanded Judicial Review of 
Arbitration Awards, 8 NEV. L.J. 214, 214 (2007). 
120 See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, 124 Stat. 2003–04 (2010) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5518(b) (2012)) (noting the 
congressional intent to restrict mandatory pre-dispute arbitration, among other things, 
under the Dodd- Frank Act). 
121 The American Arbitration Association is a not-for-profit, private, public service 
organization that offers a broad range of dispute resolution services across the United 
States.  Why AAA/ICDR Administered Alternative Dispute Resolution, AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, 
www.adr.org (last visited Apr. 23, 2012). 
122 The protocol can be found at the National Association of Arbiters.  A Due Process 
Protocol for Mediation and Arbitration of Statutory Disputes Arising out of the Employment 
Relationship, NAT’L ACAD. OF ARBITRATORS, www.naarb.org/protocol.asp (last visited Apr. 
23, 2012). 
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If the situation is left unaddressed, then we have returned to the 
days of fragmented law created by private arbitrators with nothing 
“common” about each decision.  The current state of arbitration in the 
law is becoming more likened to that found before the creation of the 
Kings Bench, with local customs deciding civil disputes in complete 
disregard to uniformity or reliability.  Until we are able to establish 
tangible and consistent protocol for arbitration clauses, all we can do is 
ask:  King Henry II, where are’t thou? 
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